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STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF PERSISTENT DISHARMONY IN 






Trade relations between the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners have 
been particularly strained in recent years. Currently important trade issues have persistent 
implications for the future economic environment of both the beef and pork industries in all 
NAFTA countries. The discovery in Canada of an animal infected with Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) in May 2003 plunged the Canadian beef industry into substantial 
financial turmoil. The immediate border closures between Canada and its major trading partners 
have had far reaching consequences that extend beyond the beef industries and impact other 
Canadian agri-food sectors (e.g., dairy industry) and other countries (e.g., U.S. and Mexico). 
Live cattle trade between Canada and the U.S. remains blocked.  This has created an incentive 
for Canada to lessen the dependence of the Canadian beef industry on its American counterpart. 
Trade challenges faced by the North American pork industry are of a different nature. 
The National Pork Producers Council (NPPC) petitioned the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(DOC) to impose Countervailing Duties (CVD) on Canadian exports of live hogs. NPPC argued 
that federal and provincial subsidies to hog producers constituted unfair subsidies that 
economically harmed U.S. hog producers. Anti-Dumping (AD) measures were also sought on 
the basis that the export price of Canadian firms was below domestic prices in the Canadian 
market. Pork industry representatives in Canada disagree with the U.S. claims and point out that 
the motives behind the trade actions are somewhat similar to previous legal trade challenges that 
occurred between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. The DOC twice ruled that Canadian hog 
producers do not receive countervailable subsidies. Moreover, the U.S International Trade 
Commission (USITC) ruled on April 6
th that Canadian exports of live hogs do not injure U.S. 
hog producers. This decision has the effect of nullifying the dumping margins previously 
established by the DOC. 
In addition to legal trade actions in the hog industry, the 2002 U.S. farm bill called for 
mandatory labeling of some agri-food products according to their country of origin. There is 
currently a great deal of uncertainty surrounding this legislation. As it stands, the law is supposed  
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to be enacted in 2006. Pork meat and bovine meat sold by mid-size and large retailers in the U.S. 
would need to bear a label indicating the country of origin of the product. Opponents to the 
Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) legislation abound in all NAFTA countries. The NPPC has 
publicly voiced its dissatisfaction with the current law and proposes a voluntary COOL program. 
Outside the United States, industry stakeholders fear that COOL is simply an attempt to segment 
the North American markets and partially break market integration.   
Even when trade measures have a temporary nature, they can cause permanent structural 
adjustments and reactions in an industry. The pork and beef sectors both experience significant 
border issues, yet the problems are fundamentally different. The hog/pork industry issues 
(CVD/AD and COOL) are tantamount to efforts aimed at segmenting the Canadian, U.S. and 
Mexican markets. Market segmentation is likely to have important welfare implications. The 
border closure following the BSE case has introduced market failures in beef markets such that 
standard marketing arrangements can no longer be assumed to ensure economically efficient 
transactions between producers, packers and retailers. Hence, policy responses and industry 
adjustments are likely to differ between sectors. 
  The objective of this paper is to discuss the various adjustments available to policy 
makers and industry stakeholders to deal with current border problems in the beef and pork 
sectors. Various options can be considered and they include herd contraction in Canada and 
Mexico, re-location of processing activities, reforming agricultural policies and other trade 
measures. We highlight how some of these adjustments and policy responses are likely to shape 
future production and processing across Canada and the United States. These responses are likely 
to make North American supply chains less integrated and have significant welfare implications.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the North 
American beef and pork industry structures. The third section analyzes the potential policy 
responses and industry adjustments in light of the BSE trade issue. Section four investigates 
industry adjustments that are likely to occur if COOL and AD/CVD lessen the integration of the 
NAFTA pork markets. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in the last section. 
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BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PORK AND BEEF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
Pork 
The U.S., Canada and Mexico are among the major pork producing countries in the world. The 
U.S. and Canada were respectively the third and fifth largest pork producing regions in 2003 
with a production of 9,073 and 1,895 metric tons. Mexico was the eleventh most important pork 
producing country with production of 1,150 metric tons. Production growth in the three countries 
has differed. Canada has experienced the most significant growth over the last 25 years as 
production expanded more than 80% from 1,034 Metric Tons (MT) in 1980 to the current level. 
As production grew, the trade balance of Canada with its most important trade partners also 
significantly evolved. Canadian total pork exports have grown from 149 MT in 1980 to 975 MT 
in 2003 (Haley, 2004).  
  In order to understand and explain potential adjustments in the North American hog/pork 
industry brought by the trade issues, it is necessary to understand the inner working of each 
industry. In this regard, we particularly focus on the Canadian and U.S. hog/pork industries. 
Haley (2004) describes in detail the U.S. hog/pork industry. There is no doubt that the legal 
challenge brought by the NPPC and other regional hog producers’ association against Canadian 
firms was caused by the recent and continuous increase in Canadian exports of live hogs. Before 
providing an organizational picture of the U.S. hog/pork industry, it is instructive to break down 
the organizational structure of their northern neighbor.  
Figure 1 breaks down the market share of each Canadian province in terms of number of 
hogs produced in 2003. Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba are the three most important hog 
producing provinces. The relative importance of Quebec is even greater if market share is 
measured in terms of kilograms of production or market value. The reason is that Ontario and 
Manitoba export significant quantities of feeder pigs resulting in their proportional shares being 
greater in terms of head produced relative to dollars or kilograms. The pie chart presents the 
rationale behind our decision to focus exclusively on the hog/pork industry in these three 
provinces for the remainder of the paper. These provinces account for more than three quarters of 
Canadian hog production.  
Figure 2 illustrates the market destination of live hogs in Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba 
for 2003. There are some striking differences between the three provinces. First, all hogs raised  
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in the province of Quebec are slaughtered within the province.
1 Processing activities have a 
relatively lesser importance with respect to total hog production in Manitoba. Manitoba exports a 
significant quantity of feeder pigs to the United States as does Ontario. The chart also illustrates 
that there are hogs in Ontario transferred to other provinces (e.g., Quebec). These include hogs 
ready-to-be slaughtered and feeder pigs.  
Figures 3 and 4 present the growth in exports of live slaughter hogs and feeder pigs 
respectively in Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba. Hog exports from Quebec are almost non-
existent. Exports of slaughter hogs increased dramatically around 1996 in Ontario and Manitoba. 
Conversely, Figure 4 illustrates that exports of feeder pigs have grown steadily since 1994 to 
reach record levels in 2003. Hayley (2004) reports that the destination of Canadian feeder pigs in 
the U.S. is mainly to corn belt states.
2 Canadian exports of slaughter hogs are more evenly spread 
across the United States and go to such states as Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Utah, Arizona, California, etc.  
Figures 5a, 5b and 5c present respectively the total growth in pork exports from Quebec, 
Ontario and Manitoba as well as to their two most important destinations: the U.S. and Japan. 
Pork exports have increased substantially in Quebec starting in 1994. As exports grew, the 
relative importance of the U.S. market has declined over the years; but it still remains the most 
important destination for Canadian pork exports. This market diversification has not been as 
strong in Ontario and Manitoba.  
Table 1 provides a very brief picture of the U.S. hog/pork industry over a ten-year period 
(1994 – 2003).  The numbers between parentheses can be used to assess the size of the Canadian 
industry with respect to its counterpart. For example, hog production reached 100,777 million 
heads in 2003 and Canadian production represented about 22% of U.S. production. Hog 
slaughters in Canada increased in relative terms compared to the U.S. between 1994 and 2003; 
going from 15.9 percent of U.S. production to more than 22 percent. U.S. Pork meat imports 
have increased in the U.S. and so did Canadian imports. Figures 5a through 5c already 
established that Canadian exports are more diversified in terms of destination in that the relative 
importance of the U.S. market as slightly declined over the years. Although not illustrated in the 
data, the share of Canadian products in total U.S. pork imports has increased between 1998 and 
                                                 
1 Larue, Gervais and Lapan (2005) stress the importance of hog marketing institutions in explaining the 
simultaneous growth in production and processing activities in Quebec. 
2 These states are IN, MI, MN, OH, WI, IA, KS, MO, and NE.  
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2003. Finally, Canada has been the largest pork exporter of the two countries between 2000 and 
2003 as pork exports from Canada represent 118.4 percent of total U.S. pork exports.   
The stylized facts of the pork industry show that besides the obvious differences in 
bilateral trade balances between the U.S. and Canada, there are some essential geographical 
differences in production activities within each country that are likely to affect policies and 
industry adjustments. These are likely to have a major importance when analyzing the effects of 
border restrictions and market segmentation.   
 
Beef 
The U.S. has long been the world’s largest beef producer with 2005 forecasted production of 
more than 11.2 million MT representing about 22% of total world beef production. In contrast, 
Canada’s 2005 beef production is forecasted to be 1.5 million MT representing just under 3% of 
total world production (Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA). Figure 6 illustrates the recent 
trend in world beef production by the top four producing countries and Canada. Phenomenal 
growth in beef production has been occurring in recent years in Brazil and China. Brazil’s beef 
production has grown at an average rate of 4.4% from 2000 to 2005 and China’s production has 
increased even faster at an average annual rate of 5.6% over the past six years. Brazil has gone 
from having production that was about half that of the U.S. in 2000 to a projected nearly 75% of 
U.S. beef production by 2005.     
The U.S. and Canada are important exporters in the world market. However, formidable 
competitors are present.  Particularly noteworthy global beef export competitors include Brazil, 
Australia, Argentina, New Zealand, and lately India (figure 7). With the U.S. loss of major 
export markets resulting from the December 2003 discovery of a cow in Washington State with 
BSE, the U.S. went from representing just fewer than 20% of world exports in 2003 to about 3% 
in 2004. During this time, Brazil greatly increased its world export market presence going from 
14% share of world beef exports in 2002 to an expected 25% in 2005 (Foreign Agricultural 
Service, USDA). Canada lost considerable export market share in 2003 following discovery of a 
cow infected with BSE; however, they have regained some of that lost share representing about 
9% of world beef exports in 2005.    
Two important summary points regarding the above discussion are: 1) the U.S. is a large 
country in terms of beef production and trade and Canada is probably more of a price taker in the  
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world arena, and 2) substantial competition in the global beef market is present and this will 
continue to have great influence on the future structure of the beef industry in the U.S. and 
Canada. 
  The U.S. and Canadian cattle and beef industries operated largely as a single North 
American industry prior to discovery of an animal infected with BSE in Canada in May 2003.  
Feeder cattle, slaughter steers and heifers, slaughter cows and bulls, breeding animals, and 
processed beef flowed freely between the two countries in response to economic signals. A 
substantial amount of this trade flow was cattle movement from Canada to the U.S. For example, 
in 2002 (the most recent full year of unrestricted trade in cattle between the two countries), 
approximately 62,000 dairy cattle, 8,000 veal animals, 583,000 feeder cattle, 17,000 breeding 
animals, and 1,024,000 slaughter cattle were exported from Canada to the U.S. (data obtained 
from the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association). Canadian slaughter cattle imports into the U.S. 
were just over a million head in each of the several years prior to the adoption of import 
restrictions by the US (figure 8). However, on May 20, 2003 when a single cow in Canada was 
discovered to be infected with BSE, export of all ruminants and ruminant products from Canada 
to the U.S. was suspended.   
Beginning in late August 2003 a restricted set of boneless beef products were once again 
allowed to be exported from Canada to the US and these products have continued to be exported 
since that time.  As a result, U.S. imports of Canadian boxed beef reached record levels in 2004 
with volume representing approximately 1.77 million head of fed cattle (figure 9).   
 
BEEF INDUSTRY ADJUSTMENTS AND POLICY RESPONSES 
Closure of the U.S.-Canadian border to cattle trade created substantial price discounts in Canada 
for feeder and fed cattle and cull cows relative to the U.S.  Prior to the border closure, Canadian 
and U.S. prices followed each other fairly closely as fluid trade assured spatially integrated 
markets.  However, after the border closure, because the Canadian cattle industry relied upon the 
U.S. market for slaughter cattle shipments, prices diverged with Canadian prices dropping 
$20/cwt and more relative to U.S. levels (figures 10-12).   
On January 4, 2005 the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) published a final rule that would permit imports of certain 
Canadian live cattle into the U.S. beginning on March 7, 2005.  That rule provided that such  
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cattle must be less than 30 months of age sent directly to slaughter or, if destined for additional 
feeding, sent in sealed trucks directly to the terminal feedlot that finishes and markets the cattle 
for slaughter at less than 30 months of age.  As published, the rule also allowed for imports of 
boneless beef from Canadian cattle older than 30 months of age.  However, U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture Mike Johanns announced an indefinite delay of imports of Canadian beef from 
animals over 30 months of age prior to the March 7 date.
3 Thus, the current policy allows for 
imports from Canada only of cattle that are under 30 months of age and beef from animals of the 
same age category.  However, on March 2, 2005 a federal judge in Montana granted a temporary 
injunction against USDA to keep the Canadian border closed to live cattle trade. As of the date 
of this paper, the U.S. border remains closed to imports of Canadian cattle and it appears the 
current status will persist at least into this summer.
4   
The impacts of this trade policy between Canada and the U.S. has caused substantial costs 
to the U.S. beef packing industry (compounded by the loss of major export markets in the U.S. 
following the BSE discovery in December 2003). In 2002, the last full year of unrestricted cattle 
trade between U.S. and Canada, Canadian slaughter cattle imports represented about 3% of total 
U.S. cattle slaughter. However, Canadian slaughter cattle import restrictions had much greater 
relative impact in certain U.S. states. Table 2 presents the number of Canadian slaughter cattle 
imports by U.S. state of destination, slaughter in each of those states, and the percentage of 
slaughter represented by Canadian imported cattle in 2002. The state of Utah was clearly 
impacted the most by restricted Canadian slaughter cattle imports as beef packers in Utah 
imported more than 200,000 head in 2002, representing 30% of the state’s total slaughter. Other 
states where packers were strongly impacted in number of head and/or percentage of slaughter 
represented by Canadian cattle imports included Washington, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Idaho, Michigan, and New Jersey. 
To determine the economic importance of Canadian cattle slaughtered in the U.S., table 3 
summarizes live value and estimated market value of boxed beef, hide, and offal by state from 
Canadian cattle imports for 2002.  For the U.S. as a whole, the live value of Canadian imported 
slaughter cattle was around $755-$801 million in 2002, depending upon whether Agriculture and 
Agri-Food Canada or USDA data are used. Of additional importance for U.S. processing firms is 
                                                 
3 USDA Statement by Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns.  Release No. 0047.05, February 9, 2005. 
4 Source:  Meatingplace.com http://www.meatingplace.com  
  8
the value of boxed beef, hide, and offal from slaughtering Canadian cattle and the gross margin 
of product sales relative to the cost of cattle. The value differential between the purchase price of 
the cattle and the value of beef, hide, and offal is estimated using data from the Livestock 
Marketing Information Center.   
For the entire U.S., the gross sales value of boxed beef and byproduct sales from 
Canadian imported slaughter cattle was $901-$956 million with a net value of these output sales 
value less the live animal price being around $145-$155 million in 2002 (table 3). Individual 
states had substantial variability in sales value associated with Canadian cattle slaughter. For 
example, Utah had $203 million, Washington $161 million, and Nebraska and Minnesota each 
over $100 million in sales value of boxed beef and byproducts from slaughtering Canadian 
cattle. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin each had more than $80 million in sales of boxed beef and 
byproducts from Canadian cattle slaughtered in 2002.   
One more important issue that increases the economic impact associated with the ban on 
Canadian slaughter cattle imports into the U.S. is reduced packing plant capacity utilization in 
the U.S.  That is, packing firms still incur fixed costs whether they operate at capacity or not and 
with reduced cattle availability, especially in regions like those mentioned above, failure to 
operate at capacity creates a major competitive disadvantage for those plants and firms. For 
example, Swift suspended its second shift at its Nebraska and Colorado plants in large part 
because of the import restrictions. Such events result in particular packing plants and firms 
suffering significant economic difficulties because operating costs per pound of meat produced 
rise rapidly when plants operate below capacity. The entire U.S. cattle slaughtering and beef 
processing industry faced increased costs when such a large reduction in cattle supply was 
imposed by the import restrictions. The result is that eventually some U.S. plants are forced to 
close down. In addition, numerous other economic spillover effects occur to the rest of the local 
and national economy when cattle slaughter declines. 
  Schroeder and Leatherman (2004) used social accounting matrix (SAM) analysis to 
project the annual economic impacts of reduced meat processing activity in the U.S. that was 
consistent with the amount of reduced imports of slaughter cattle from Canada resulting from 
import restrictions. The total loss of income to the U.S. economy associated with reduced meat 
processing activity was estimated to be about US$ 282 million annually (table 4). The number of 
jobs closely allied with this level of economic activity was nearly 5,000.    
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The long run implication of the U.S. border closure to Canadian live cattle is that it is 
fueling structural change. In particular, closure of the border has created substantial incentives 
for Canada to invest in cattle slaughter facilities. As such, substantial public support and private 
investment in cattle slaughter plant expansion is on-going in Canada. Figure 13 illustrates 
projected expansion in Canadian cattle slaughter facilities. Slaughter increased nearly 1 million 
head in 2004 relative to 2003 and is expected to increase another half a million head in 2005 with 
continued expansion planned.
5 If this expansion continues and the border remains closed, Canada 
will expand its slaughter capacity to be able to fully accommodate its own production. If and 
when the U.S. border re-opens to live cattle trade, excess cattle slaughter capacity will exist in 
North America and only those firms well positioned to compete will survive. Obviously this 
leads to substantial economic costs for both trading partners that will strain open relations. 
The BSE crisis has also had far reaching consequences that extend beyond the beef 
industry. Prices of Canadian dairy cows have plummeted following the BSE discovery.   
Livestock producers must generally commit production before uncertainty about prices is 
resolved. Insurance markets have an important role in re-establishing the case for free trade in 
the case of small country that faces exogenous terms of trade (Eaton and Grossman, 1985). 
When the border closes due to a random event like BSE, risk sharing mechanisms that may exist 
between packers and cattle producers are significantly affected. For example, the border closure 
introduced one market failure in Quebec and Ontario dairy industries because the market for 
dairy cows was then controlled by a single buyer. Dairy producers used to rely on the U.S. export 
market to expand the relevant market of the sole beef packer in Eastern Canada which otherwise 
had monopsony power over purchases of cull cows. Packers’ costs have undoubtedly gone up 
after May 2003 due to the loss of export markets for certain beef cuts, increased storage costs, 
etc. However in that particular case, the monopsony position generated abnormal profits by 
pulling prices of dairy cows to historical lows. Even though dairy producers can rely on supply 
management to support income, there is nevertheless a market failure (monopsony) and thus a 
(theoretical) justification for government intervention.  
  It did not take long for the dairy lobby to get rolling after the BSE discovery. Dairy 
producers argued that the mad cow case was responsible for a 10-20% reduction in their net 
                                                 
5 The federal government decided to encourage expansion through a Can$ 66.2 million program. Details 
are available at: www.agr.gc.ca/cb/index_e.php?s1=n&s2=2004&page=n40910a 
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income. They lobbied the government for months trying to get a minimum price for their cows. 
The Quebec provincial government led a financial mediation between producers and the owners 
of the Colbex-Levinoff company who held the monopsony position. It resulted in the sale to 
dairy producer of an 80% stake in the company. After complaining for months that they were not 
receiving a fair price for their cows and that the government needed to step in to impose a floor 
price, producers were quick to point out that they were not able to pay that target price without 
financial help. The government then offered a financial package to dairy producers that 
guaranteed a floor price for all dairy cow sales.
6  
It is unsure at this stage if Quebec dairy producers have sufficient funds to cover their 
stake in the company and whether the government promised to inject funds in the project. Given 
the monopsony situation, it would normally make good economic sense to subsidize purchases of 
cull cows to resolve the market failure. However, dairy producers’ supply of dairy cows is very 
inelastic and subsidizing purchases is tantamount to pure income redistribution. The subsidies 
needed to support the floor price amount to input cost subsidies for the packing plant. It may give 
an incentive to the packer to push further down prices (now that producers receive a guaranteed 
price) and thus may yield an unfair competitive advantage (at least with respect to other 
Canadian competitors) in the meat output market. Finally, it should be noted that consumers 
clearly lost when the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) announced on December 10, 2004 an 
increase in the price of milk in part “to offset some of the negative impacts of the BSE crisis on 
farms” (CDC, 2004). Consumers will permanently bear some costs of BSE because it is well 
known that milk prices exhibit downward price stickiness. 
  
PORK INDUSTRY ADJUSTMENTS AND POLICY RESPONSES 
Market impacts of CVDs and COOL 
It is extremely difficult to dismiss the political dimension of the trade issues in the hog/pork 
industries. Nevertheless, there is more to this than simple political-economy factors. The 
economic implications of these trade issues will be considered before focusing on the potential 
                                                 
6 Although the sale of Colbex-Levinof plants to Quebec dairy producers was announced in December 2
nd, 
2004, there is still ongoing discussion to finalize the transaction at the moment this paper is being written. 
The purchase price was never confirmed (although it was rumored to be in the neighborhood of 50 
millions dollars). Moreover, the provincial government’s plan to establish a floor price was conditional on 
the participation of the federal government; but they did not obtain the federal commitment before 
publicly announcing their plan to help producers.   
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industry adjustments and responses available to policy makers. Price signals following import 
duties or country of origin labeling will ultimately determine industry adjustments.  
First, imposing barriers to trade in the hog sector is often overlooked as a possible tool to 
improve economic welfare in the U.S. This is somewhat surprising as it is now well understood 
in the economics literature
7 that a large importing country can increase national welfare if it 
faces endogenous terms of trade by restricting trade below the free trade level. This objective can 
be achieved using either a tariff or a quota. The improvement in the terms of trade (in terms of 
lowering the import price) is achieved at the expense of introducing distortions in consumption 
and production activities.   
The NAFTA prevent countries to restrict trade in pork and beef. However, a number of 
policy combinations will achieve a potential first-best tariff solution from the U.S. perspective 
because an import tariff can always be decomposed into a production subsidy and a consumption 
tax. A countervailing duty (which is essentially an import tariff in retaliation for foreign 
subsidies) could potentially yield an increase in U.S. welfare. The CVD on imports of live hogs 
amounts to a subsidy to U.S. hog producers and a “consumption” tax for U.S. processors. 
Equivalently, if feeder pigs are taxed at the border, the trade policy amounts to a subsidy to 
feeder hog production and a tax on slaughter hog production and processing activities. It is far 
from obvious that the total welfare in the U.S. hog/pork industry would increase following an 
import duty; but this possibility should not be overlooked. We argue that it is indeed important to 
understand the terms-of-trade motives in order to explain the political pressures to apply import 
duties.   
In order to understand the market impacts of CVDs, consider the vertically related 
markets drawn in Figure 14. The diagrams on the left hand-side of the figure represent the U.S. 
market for live hogs (bottom left) and the U.S. market for pork (top left). In the bottom left 
diagram, the segment  () Sr represents the supply curve of U.S. hog producers and  ( ) ; Drp 
represents the hog demand of U.S. processors.  The demand of hogs is dependent on the price of 
pork meat () p  determined in the top diagrams. The segment  ( ) ; Sp r is the supply schedule of 
                                                 
7 Gervais and Larue (2005) provide a useful survey of the terms of trade motive for protection. Despite 
the large attention devoted to the theory of the “optimal tariff”, many economists remain sceptical of its 
practical value when analyzing “real life” issues. Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) in particular state that it is 
of “doubtful usefulness”. Yet, Bagwell and Staiger (2002) give primary emphasis to the terms of trade 
approach in their most influential book on the economics of the world trading system.  
  12
pork processors while the segment  ( ) Dp represents the U.S. demand of pork meat. Given the 
trade position of the U.S. with Canada, Figure 14 assumes that the U.S. is a net importer of both 
live hogs and pork meat. The diagrams on the right hand-side of Figure 14 are labeled as “trade 
markets” as they draw the excess demand function in the U.S. and the excess supply function of 
Canadian hog producers and pork processors. Because the U.S. has an influence on the price at 
which it trades (i.e., the large country assumption), it faces upward export supply functions for 
hogs (denoted  () ESr) and pork (denoted  ( ) ESp). Free-trade between the two countries 
determines the equilibrium prices in the U.S. market ( ) 00 ,
US US rp and the quantities traded 
() ,
US US
rp MM. Domestic quantities of hogs produced and slaughtered are respectively denoted by 
0 H  and  0 Q . 
Now consider the application of countervailing and anti-dumping duties on exports of 
live hogs from Canada. The market effects of this policy are illustrated in Figure 15. The 
CVD/AD duties shift inward the excess demand of live hogs in the United States; reducing 
imports of live hogs to 
US
r M ′. The import duties create a spread between the U.S. and Canadian 
price of hogs. The increase in the U.S. hog price shifts inward the U.S. supply of pork in the top-
left diagram. The price of pork meat increases and so are imports of pork meat into the U.S. As a 
result, less hogs are slaughtered in the U.S. but more hogs are fed domestically (i.e., 
10 0 1 ; HH QQ >< ). As mentioned before, the import duties have similar effects than a tax on live 
hogs (causing a reduction in the demand of live hogs) and a subsidy to hog production. Even 
though, the U.S. is able to improve its terms of trade for hogs, it experiences deterioration in its 
terms of trade for pork. Hence, the net welfare effects are ambiguous. Nevertheless, the analysis 
in Figure 15 illustrates the shift in production across countries following import duties.  Imports 
of live hogs decrease; but imports of pork meat into the U.S. should increase. 
Before analyzing the regional implications of import duties and border “frictions”, it is 
worth discussing the (dis)similarities between the CVD/AD duties and COOL. We argue that 
COOL has similar effects to import duties; but they differ in the potential response that these 
policy tools can bring. With respect to labeling, the U.S. is using potential vertical differentiation 
in meat products (according to the country of origin) to induce a price differential between U.S. 
and foreign meat products. The price differential caused by the label can only be achieved at the  
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expense of imposing a tax on the domestic industry in the form of additional transaction costs 
necessary to preserve the national identity of the products through the supply chain. The idea of 
those supporting the COOL policy in the U.S. is that potential premiums in the meat market 
would be transferred back to U.S. hog producers through higher prices. Preliminary research 
results reported by Abdesselem, Bonroy and Gervais (2005) indicate that COOL could 
potentially raise the U.S. hog price by about one-half of a percent while raising pork meat prices 
in the U.S. by 6%. Canadian export prices of pork meat could fall by about two percent. The 
effect of COOL on hog prices is likely to be smaller than the effect of CVD/AD duties. 
Moreover, the results rest on rather optimistic assumptions with regard to consumers’ attitude. 
As before, welfare implications of the COOL policy are unclear.
8     
  What is the optimal response from the Canadian’s perspective? First best policy in light 
of anti-dumping and CVD is laissez-faire. There are no market failures from the Canadian 
government’s perspective. With respect to the COOL issue, one option for the Canadian industry 
is to use generic promotion for their product in certain geographical areas (such as the U.S. 
Northeast region). Larue, Gervais and Rancourt (2003) have shown that Canadian pork 
processors are not pure price takers in the U.S. market because export price margins do not 
adjust in a one-to-one proportion following variations in the exchange rate. Exchange rate has 
always been an important concern of the Canadian hog/pork industry because it is believed to be 
a major determinant of the industry’s relative competitiveness. While there is no doubt that it is a 
significant factor, data suggests that it played a secondary role in the expansion of the Canadian 
hog/pork industry (Tamini and Gervais, 2005). 
 
Location of hog/pork production activities 
Is the location of hog and pork production activities supply or demand driven? The stylized facts 
described earlier suggest that hog/pork operations are supply driven in that processing activities 
tend to occur where ready-to-market hogs are fed and feeding operations tend to locate in regions 
                                                 
8 Abdesselem, Bonroy and Gervais (2005) use a spatial partial equilibrium model of trade in hog/pork 
products for North America. The results reported above are based on a COOL transaction cost estimate of 
0.10 Can$ per kg and a premium of 0.25 Can$ per kg at the retail level for products with a U.S. label. 
These estimates were adapted from Sparks (2003) and Loureiro and Umberger (2003). Their model is 
calibrated using 2002 data. The welfare implications of a spatial equilibrium model with vertical 
differentiation have never been fully explored in the literature. It is difficult to use price and trade flow 
impacts derived under a linear approximation of North American hog/pork markets to figure out the full 
welfare effects in the context of a vertically differentiated trade model.   
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that have a comparative cost advantage in feeding activities. Before analyzing the potential 
localization impacts of CVDs and COOL, it is worth discussing further the assumptions behind 
figures 14 and 15 that are likely to impact on location. First, figures 14 and 15 implicitly assume 
that markets are competitive and that there are decreasing returns to scale (positively sloped 
marginal cost) in slaughtering/processing activities. MacDonald and Ollinger (2000) showed that 
significant scale economies in the hog slaughtering activities do exist. There are major 
differences between plant sizes between Canada and the U.S. In Quebec, the biggest processing 
plant has a weekly capacity of 25,000 heads. In comparison, the average capacity of a plant in 
the U.S. was about 45,000 heads per week ten years ago. Some plants have weekly capacity of 
70,000 head per week and some even reach 150,000 head (Pork Board, 2003). Another implicit 
assumption is there is perfect competition in the industry. The concentration ratio of the four 
biggest firms (CR-4) in the U.S. packing industry evolved from 32 in 1985 to 64 in 2004 
(Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2005). In Quebec, the two largest packers have announced their 
intentions to merge. If the merger is approved by the competition Bureau of Canada, the new 
entity would control more than 70% of the market in Quebec.  
  Concentration and economies of scale are not so important to understand the adjustments 
of the industry at the macro level (i.e., national) but are rather determinant forces when 
understanding the regional impacts of COOL and CVD/AD duties. As alluded to in Figure 15, 
the CVD/AD and COOL policies will likely result in lower hog prices in Canada and more hogs 
slaughtered in Canada. There is no indication that there are packing capacity problems in 
Canada. In fact, the industry has deplored many times that there was not enough hogs to process 
domestically.
9 In Quebec, most if not all plants operate a single shift and so is the trend 
throughout Canada.  
Yet there is no denying that if U.S. policies increase marketing margins of Canadian 
packers (in terms of stronger demand for pork meat and lower hog prices), a number of factors 
suggest that there may be sizeable investment opportunities. Traditional investment models rely 
on standard discounted cash flow methods such as net present value or internal rate of return 
models. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) changed the way academics (and to some extent practitioners) 
                                                 
9 Klein et al., (1995, p.57) write: “Virtually all packers in Canada would like to receive more hogs of 
constant specified qualities.  They sense market opportunities for additional pork but cannot obtain the 
hogs to meet this demand”. Mitchell (1998) who represents a packing plant write: “… we have the sales; 
we don't have the hogs”.  
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think about investment decisions by focusing on real options. Real options are essentially future 
opportunities that are created by today’s investments. Given a potential terms of trade movement 
(i.e. reduction in the Canadian hog price and increase in the border price of meat), some firms 
may perceive a significant increase in future discounted cash flows. However, at the time of the 
investment, a firm loses the option to wait for further information such as the strength of future 
foreign demand, input costs, etc. The option value associated with waiting before building 
additional capacity will depend among other things on whether firms perceive movements in the 
marketing margin to be mean reverting. In turn this will depend on the beliefs about the 
intransience of border measures. If firms do not perceive the trade impediment to have some 
permanent component, it would be logical to expect these firms to delay investment in capacities. 
Processing firms produce a homogenous product and are thus especially vulnerable financially to 
(bad) capacity decisions of others. The timing option (i.e., the option to wait) has an interesting 
value given the relatively uncertain state of the industry. Hence, it is doubtful that CVDs or 
COOL would cause investment in additional capacities.  
Hog marketing institutions can also have an important impact on capacity investment 
decisions. The hog marketing rules basically establish cost and supply certainty for Quebec 
processors in that a substantial share (currently 50%) of all available hogs is attributed to 
processors according to their historical market share. All hogs in the province need to be 
marketed through the Quebec marketing board. In Prairies, no statutory marketing rights are 
conferred to provincial boards. Producers are free to contract with one packer over the other. 
This definitely gives more flexibility to processors in terms of pricing arrangements. Hogs are 
sold either through contracts or using the spot market.  
A recent study also shed some doubts about whether Canadian hog producers would 
benefit from increased processing capacity. Hornung and Ward (2005) analyze whether the 
opening of the Maple Leaf Brandon plant in Manitoba had any positive bearing on Prairie hog 
prices. They identified a significant price differential between the Manitoba market and two 
different reference markets due to the opening of the Brandon plant. However, producers’ 
perceptions ran contrary to their findings in some cases. A significant share of producers did not 
believe that the opening of the plant stimulated competition and ultimately raised hog prices in 
Manitoba.   
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Capacity is perhaps more problematic when analyzing hog finishing operations. Growth 
opportunities in hog finishing operations are rather severely constrained because of 
environmental concerns or simple profitability considerations. The former is perhaps the most 
apparent in Quebec. The hog industry is facing stringent environmental regulations and public 
pressure to regulate the industry does not show any sign that it will ease anytime soon. A two-
year moratorium in Quebec was imposed on all new hog finishing operations in June 2002. The 
moratorium was lifted December 15, 2004 after strict new environmental regulations were 
issued. For all practical matters, the moratorium is still under effect because ready-to-market 
hogs produced in hog finishing installations that were built in the post-moratorium period will 
not be slaughtered until mid-2007 once every necessary delay in production is considered 
(licensing, investment, etc.). Many industry stakeholders doubt that vigorous growth in the 
industry observed between 1994 and 2002 will ever be able to resume.  
Besides the need to solve obvious environmental constraints, hog finishing operations 
must be able to compete with American production units for feeder pigs. CVDs and COOL 
might provide the sufficient financial conditions for Canadian production units to expand hog 
finishing operations. One would expect that hog finishing units would locate in the Prairie region 
because of its potential comparative cost advantage in feed grains. However, Manitoba is a net 
importer of corn (Charlebois and Wensley, 2003) and feed wheat would likely need to be 
shipped in from Saskatchewan (Kraft and Rude, 2002) if the province ever decide to expand hog 
production. The potential growth in livestock industries could likely offset any price reduction in 
feeder pigs due to bottlenecks at the border.   
Cost increases for finishing operations could be less of a problem if income support 
programs could account for this increase. In Quebec, hog producers (both feeder pigs and 
slaughter hogs) benefit from a generous public income support program known under the French 
acronym ASRA. ASRA basically guarantees hog producers that they will receive no less than the 
producers’ average cost of production, which includes the payment of the producers’ own labor 
hours. The Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) program available to other 
producers is less generous but could potentially shield producers from market effects induced by 
temporary border restrictions. What is the likelihood that these programs will be reformed in the 
near to medium future? These programs are the specific targets of the American legal actions. 
Even though Quebec producers do not export live animals, ASRA has explicitly been singled out  
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as depressing hog prices in North America (Giordano, 2005). Because of the moratorium on new 
hog production facilities, some hog producers in Quebec have converted their maternity permit 
into hog finishing operations. This has caused a movement in feeder pigs from Ontario to 
Quebec. Quebec producers could be shielded from price signals induced by temporary border 
restrictions. In the world trade arena, there are some pressures to reform domestic support and 
aggressive cuts in “de minimis” support could affect the efficiency of ASRA-like programs in 




There is no arguing that prior to 2003 BSE discoveries, the U.S. and Canada had a highly 
integrated beef industry. For all practical matters, the U.S. and Canadian hog/pork industries 
evolved in a fairly integrated market. Border trade restrictions, Countervailing (CVD) and Anti-
Dumping (AD) duties, as well as Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) legislation threaten this 
market integration. Cattle and beef trade between the two countries has historically been largely 
market driven. However, since May 2003, cattle and beef trade in North America has been 
substantially restricted and dictated by political and judicial decisions. This has resulted in 
structural change in the beef industry in both Canada and the U.S. Canada has invested sizeable 
amounts of public and private money into further development of their cattle slaughtering 
industry. The U.S. cattle slaughter industry lost substantial cattle numbers that are critical for 
plant utilization and operating at cost efficient levels. Losses have been especially acute in 
regions that are not in the heart of cattle feeding and in states near the border. Reduced cattle 
slaughter has resulted in significant income losses especially for local communities in the U.S. 
where beef packing plants have either reduced operations or closed down entirely. 
What will happen when the border reopens to live animal trade? Obviously this depends 
upon when it reopens and the conditions surrounding its opening. However, likely excess 
capacity will be present in North American cattle slaughtering resulting in costly plant closures.  
In the mean time, while North America trade policy creates substantial cost increases in its 
                                                 
10 De minimis support is the trade distorting domestic support (product-and non-product specific) that is 
less than 5% of the value of production (10% for developing countries). There are currently some 
proposals in the Doha Round to cut the level of de minimis support in half.  
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industry, formidable global competitors have continued to expand. Regaining world market 
dominance will be a daunting challenge for the North American beef industry.   
It is difficult to predict what will happen in the North American hog/pork industry given 
that policy options on both sides of the border are yet to play out. The U.S. trade policies (CVDs 
and ADs) and domestic policy (COOL) are likely to lower prices of feeder pigs in Canada and 
raise pork meat prices in both markets. These terms of trade effects will likely have implications 
on the future organization of the North American hog/pork industry. Four factors must be taken 
into account when analyzing organizational issues: 1) environmental pressures are likely to slow 
further development of finishing operations in Canada; 2) the relative value of the Canadian 
currency with respect to the U.S. dollar has reached a 10-year high recently and further 
appreciation would negatively impact the profitability of pork processing operations; 3) internal 
pressures in Canada as well as international pressures to lower domestic support levels are likely 
to reduce total support and thus limit future growth in hog production; 4) concentration and 
consolidation arguments to raise the competitiveness of Canadian pork packers could result in 
lower Canadian hog prices. We argue that the current business context in the hog/pork industry is 
not conducive of massive investment opportunities in processing and hog finishing capacities. 
Thus, if border policies have any sense of permanence, it is likely that the Canadian industry will 
struggle in trying to bring feeder pigs to ready-to-market weight. We are likely to see a 
contraction in the marketing of feeder pigs. 
In summary, both U.S. and Canada stand to lose if special interests have their way in 
promoting bottlenecks at the border. What is the solution? Mexican President Fox is promoting 
the idea of “NAFTA-plus” which in his words includes more development, more trade and more 
integration. The support for such an idea seems to come exclusively from eastern Canada; 
Quebec Premier Charest endorsed the idea, but also pushed for stronger dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Both the U.S. and Canada have reiterated their official position not to renegotiate 
NAFTA. There is no momentum in Western Canada to re-negotiate specific NAFTA provisions. 
There is even less interest in the U.S. to renegotiate a deal which some once considered as 
weakening U.S. domestic policies. The answer perhaps lies in stronger commitment and 
leadership to promote multilateral talks at the WTO. This would seem to us the most appropriate 
mean to address North American farmers concerns about development, market access and tariff 
reductions.   
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Figure 1. Provincial share of total Canadian hog marketings  
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Figure 2. Market destination of all hogs marketed in Quebec,  
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Figure 3. Exports of slaughter hogs from Quebec,  
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Figure 5a.  Pork meat exports from Quebec to the U.S. and  



















Figure 5b.  Pork meat exports from Ontario to the U.S. and  






















Figure 5c. Pork meat exports from Manitoba to the U.S. and  
Japan from January 1992 to December 2003.  
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 Hog  slaughter 
(head) 
Pork imports  
(000 MT) 
  Pork exports  
(000 MT) 
1994    95,905 (15.9)      338,077 (8.3)      284,114 (98.1) 
1995    96,517 (16.1)    301,801 (8.9)    365,259 (98.5) 
1996    92,394 (16.2)  281,311 (12.5)    413,166 (93.2) 
1997    91,966 (16.5)  287,316 (18.0)    458,311 (91.8)   
1998    101,028 (16.5)  320,302 (19.4)    528,939 (89.5) 
1999   101,694  (18.6)       375,961 (15.4)       580,501 (89.5) 
2000    97,977 (20.1)  439,359 (13.5)    584,846 (108.9) 
2001     97,962 (21.0)  432,157 (15.8)    708,845 (101.4) 
2002    100,263 (21.9)  486,694 (15.9)    732,831 (122.9) 
2003    100,777 (22.1)  538,724 (20.2)    780,387(118.4) 






















Source: Foreign Ag Service, USDA 
Figure 6. Market shares of World Beef Production by Country for Four 










































Source: Foreign Ag Service, USDA 
Figure 7.  Market Shares of Seven Largest World Beef Exporters  
by Country, 2000-2005 ('05 forecasted) 
 
 
Source: USDA; *Import restrictions started in May 2003.  
Figure 8. Annual Imports of Canadian Slaughter Cattle, 1999 – 2004. 
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Source:  Data from Livestock Marketing Information Center,  
boxed beef converted to number of head by authors 
Figure 9.  Annual Canadian Boxed Beef (Converted to Approximate Head)  


































Source: USDA and CanFax 
Figure 10. Monthly Average Prices for 700-800 Pound Steers in  
































Source: USDA and CanFax 
Figure 11. Monthly Average Prices for Fed Steers in Kansas and  


















Source: Livestock Marketing Information Center 
Figure 12. Average Monthly Prices for Slaughter Cows in Kansas and  
Alberta, January 2000 – December 2004. 
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Table 2.  U.S. Imports of Canadian Slaughter Cattle, Total Cattle Slaughter, and  
U.S. Imports as a Percentage of Total Cattle Slaughter by State, 2002. 










(% of Total) 
Utah   205,931 680,800    30.2 
Washington   180,242 970,040    18.6 
Minnesota   145,684 1,252,600    11.6 
Nebraska   125,703 8,621,400    1.5 
Pennsylvania   101,941 1,471,800    6.9 
Wisconsin   95,551 1,766,340    5.4 
Idaho   52,868 1,051,000    5.0 
Michigan   52,028 519,600    10.0 
Colorado   33,584 2,594,200    1.3 
Illinois   12,663 NA
c   NA 
Iowa   4,073 NA    NA 
California   3,762 1,251,200    0.3 
New Jersey    3,020 22,600    13.4 
Texas   2,046 6,309,600    0.0 
South Dakota    1,399 NA    NA 
Georgia   1,394 NA    NA 
Kansas   1,078 7,362,100    0.0 
North Carolina    668 155,440    0.4 
Missouri   438 NA    NA 
Montana   175 NA    NA 
North Dakota    41 NA    NA 
Maine   36 NA    NA 
New York    28 38,800    0.1 
Ohio   25 69,900    0.0 
         
Total from Canadian Data
a    1,024,378 35,122,000    2.9 
Total from USDA Data
b   1,087,430 35,122,000    3.1 
a Source: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada  
b Source: US Department of Agriculture 




Table 3.  Estimated Value of U.S. Imports of Canadian Slaughter Cattle and Boxed  
Beef and Byproduct Sales Value and Sales Value Less Purchase Cost of  
Canadian Slaughter Cattle by U.S. Slaughter Firms, by State, 2002. 
State 
 
Live Value of 
Imports
a (U.S. $) 
Estimated Beef 
& Byproduct 
Sales Value of  
Imports
b (U.S $) 
 Estimated  Beef 
& Byproduct 
Value Less Live 
Cost
c (U.S.$) 
Utah   174,081,618 203,384,176    29,302,558
Washington   135,176,001 160,823,192    25,647,191
Minnesota   82,120,068 102,849,894    20,729,826
Nebraska   98,565,909 116,452,577    17,886,668
Pennsylvania   71,597,141 86,102,641    14,505,500
Wisconsin   66,995,411 80,591,658    13,596,247
Idaho   34,532,851 42,055,602    7,522,751
Michigan   39,761,838 47,165,063    7,403,225
Colorado   28,424,470 33,203,241    4,778,771
Illinois   10,979,184 12,781,041    1,801,857
Iowa   3,616,977 4,196,537    579,560
California   1,995,945 2,531,252    535,307
New Jersey    1,470,838 1,900,563    429,725
Texas   1,681,800 1,972,932    291,132
South Dakota    1,129,556 1,328,624    199,068
Georgia   937,108 1,135,464    198,357
Kansas   678,345 831,737    153,392
North Carolina    448,032 543,084    95,052
Missouri   416,620 478,944    62,324
Montana   136,303 161,204    24,901
North Dakota    13,905 19,739    5,834
Maine   32,679 37,802    5,123
New York    13,820 17,805    3,984
Ohio   28,411 31,968    3,557
          
Total from Canadian Data    754,834,832 900,596,741    145,761,908
Estimated Total (USDA Data)    801,296,047 956,029,819    154,733,772
aSource: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. Converted to U.S. Dollars using 2002 Exchange Rate of 1.57 Canadian 
to 1 U.S. dollar (Source: Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System). 
bBoxed beef and byproduct sales value is by definition the sum of the other two columns in this table. 
cCalculated by multiplying number of head imported from Canada by US$142.29. This number is the average 2002 
live to cutout spread (boxed beef plus byproduct less cattle purchase cost) estimated by the Livestock Marketing 





Table 4. Total Annual Employment Impact of Reduced Meat Processing  
Activity to the U.S. by Economic Sector, 2003 U.S. Dollars 




Agriculture   -1.07   -39 
Mining   -2.82   -14 
Construction   -3.97   -79 
Manufacturing   -100.90   -2,163 
TCPU
a   -24.65   -266 
Trade   -41.34   -753 
FIRE
b   -48.79   -317 
Services   -56.34  -1,291 
Government   -2.33   -38 
Total   -282.21   -4,960 
a TCPU is transportation, communications and public utilities 
b FIRE is finance, insurance and real estate 
Source: Schroeder, T. and J. Leatherman. Impacts on US Beef Packers, Workers, and the 
Economy of Restricted Cattle Trade between Canada and the United States.  Report prepared 
for National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, Canadian Cattlemen’s Association, American 























Source: Canfax; * as projected by CanFax 
Figure 13. Annual Federally Inspected Canadian Cattle Slaughter 2000-2004 
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